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Dynamically consistent Choquet random walk and real investments 
 
Robert Kast, CNRS, LAMETA Montpellier, IDEP Aix-Marseille. 
André Lapied, GREQAM, IDEP, Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille. 
 
August, 30, 2010 
Abstract: In the real investments literature, the investigated cash flow is assumed to follow 
some known stochastic process (e.g. Brownian motion) and the criterion to decide between 
investments is the discounted utility of their cash flows. However, for most new investments 
the investor may be ambiguous about the representation of uncertainty. In order to take such 
ambiguity into account, we refer to a discounted Choquet expected utility in our model. In 
such a setting some problems are to dealt with: dynamical consistency, here it is obtained in a 
recursive model by a weakened version of the axiom. Mimicking the Brownian motion as the 
limit of a random walk for the investment payoff process, we describe the latter as a binomial 
tree with capacities instead of exact probabilities on its branches and show what are its 
properties at the limit.  We show that most results in the real investments literature are 
tractable in this enlarged setting but leave more room to ambiguity as both the mean and the 
variance of the underlying stochastic process are modified in our ambiguous model. 
 
JEL classification numbers: D 81, D 83, D 92, G 31.  
Key words: Choquet integrals, conditional Choquet integrals, random walk, Brownian 
motion, real options, optimal portfolio 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
New investments are often decided in situations of uncertainty about the future states of the 
economy and future information arrivals. The real investments (or real options) literature 
(Pindyck and Dixit (1994) or Trigeorgis (1996)) assumes that uncertainty is described by 
known stochastic processes (e.g. Brownian motions), as does most of the literature in finance 
(derivative asset pricing, optimal portfolio choice, CAPM, etc.). In order to enlarge the scope 
of applications to uncertainty situations described by controversial probability distributions, or 
ambiguity about them, it is necessary to refer to new results in decision theory such as the 
multi-prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or the Choquet expected utility of 
Schmeidler (1989) that yield non-linear criteria. Non additivity of the criteria, or of the 
measure that express it, is the way to express ambiguity of the decision maker about what is 
the relevant representation of uncertainty. For instance, a convex measure, e.g. a capacity  
such that (A  B) + (A  B)   (A) + (B), for all events A and B, expresses aversion to 
ambiguity.  However many problems with non-linear models are still open. Notably, there is 
not a unique way to update non-additive measures such as Choquet capacities (see e.g. Kast, 
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Lapied and Toquebeuf, 2009). Furthermore, most models collapse to a linear one when 
dynamic consistency is required (Sarin and Wakker, 1998). Dynamics is central to investment 
problems, and the consistency of decisions with future decisions based on information arrivals 
is at the core of the real options theory. Epstein and Schmeidler (2003) propose a recursive 
multi-prior model that opens the way to applications: First, the multi-priors model is very 
close to the linear ones, so that the usual mathematics are (relatively) easy to adapt; Second, a 
recursive model, although not really dynamical (it only looks one period ahead), is sufficient 
to address most issues.  However, because of its similarity with classical models it may be the 
case that this recursive multi-prior model restricts the kind of ambiguity that one wants to 
address. In this paper, we propose another approach where a particular family of probability 
distributions is considered and is summarized by a non-additive measure: a Choquet capacity. 
Our approach is axiomatic and subjective (the measure derives from the decision maker’s 
preferences), there is no reference to an objective probability distribution that would be 
subjectively distorted (although it could be an interpretation). Furthermore we consider a 
discrete time dynamic model that we make converge toward a continuous time model, instead 
of the reverse. We address both the optimal portfolio choice of traded assets and the 
investment choice in a new non-traded asset (real investment).  
  
Valuing flexibilities and option values in consistence with information arrivals is dealt with 
linear valuation models derived from No Arbitrage conditions
1
 on equilibrium prices. Results 
are extended from the derivative assets valuation models when there exists an underlying 
traded asset. For situations where there are no such underlying assets, the real options 
literature uses an expected utility model representing the decision maker’s preferences.  In 
both cases, the underlying probability distribution is unambiguously known and the criterion 
is a linear form of future random cash flows (a Legesgue integral). Instead, we consider 
preferences could be represented by a non additive criterion: a Choquet integral with respect 
to a capacity, the core of which is a set of possible probability distributions over future states. 
In this setting, ambiguity about the underlying payoff process is taken into account, both at 
the descriptive and at the normative levels of the model. We keep close to the simplest models 
in the real options literature (Binomial processes and convergence to Brownian motions) so 
                                                
1
 Most of this literature is based on no arbitrage conditions, however these do not necessarily imply that prices 
are defined by additive integrals if bid-ask spreads prevail : see Jouini and Kallal (1995) or Chateauneuf et al. 
(1996), and De Waegenaere et al. (2003) for an equilibrium model with bid-ask spreads where prices define a 
Choquet integral. 
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that we can concentrate on extending their well-known results to ambiguity and a Choquet 
valuation criterion. 
Similarly, in optimal portfolio choice it may be the case that one wants to consider some 
ambiguity about the assets underlying probability distribution. For instance, one may want to 
add an ambiguity premium to the risk premium to answer the equity premium puzzle. Or, if 
one considers that foreign investments distributions are more ambiguous than domestic ones, 
the home-bias puzzle may be addressed by a Choquet capacity, the core of which contains all 
possible ambiguous foreign asset underlying distributions. 
Such approaches have already been developed in finance and decision theory, they face a 
difficult problem: The models’ dynamic consistency. It is well known in dynamic decision 
theory (Sarin and Wakker 1998) that dynamic consistency is an axiom that implies criteria to 
be linear most of the time. However, another axiom called consequentialism
2
 interacts with 
dynamic consistency.  So, a number of results have been obtained to show how dynamic 
consistency can still hold in a non-linear model, if one or both axioms are weakened. On the 
basis of the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) Min-Epected-Utility static model, Epstein and 
Schneider (2003) developed a dynamic (recursive) model in discrete time. It satisfies both 
dynamic consistency and consequentialism and doesn’t collapse into a linear model under the 
(non light) condition that the set of priors is rectangular. Such a model has been extended to 
continuous time by Chen and Epstein (2002) on the basis of the Duffie and Epstein (1992) 
stochastic differential utility model. In the model, uncertainty is described by a vectorial 
Brownian process defined on a space (, F, P). Ambiguity is introduced by a set of density 
generators , that define a probability Q on (, F) equivalent to P. The set  of density 
generators defines the set of priors: P = {Q:   } and under the condition that   is the 
product of its projections, P is rectangular. 
This  model has been applied to finance: Chen et Epstein (2002) study the portfolio choice 
and the problem of the continuous time CAPM; Asano (2005), Miao and Wang (2007), 
Trojanowska and Kort (2006), Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) consider the real options 
valuation and decision problem. In all these cases, ambiguity deforms the objective 
probability distribution by changing the drifts of the stochastic processes, it leaves however 
the standard deviation constant. 
In this paper, we address the same type of applications, however our model is constructed the 
other way around. First uncertainty is measured by the decision maker’s subjective 
                                                
2
 (Hammond, 1989). Consequentialism expresses that events that couldn’t occur given future information should 
not be taken into account by the decision maker. 
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representation of preferences. Dynamics is described by a discrete time Brownian motion in 
which probability  is replaced by a constant c (the ambiguous weight that the decision 
maker is putting both on the event « up » and the event « down » instead of the unambiguous 
). At the limit, we obtain a deformed Brownian motion where both the drift and the 
volatility are changed, in contrast with the Chen and Epstein (2002) model. 
In section 2, preferences on payoffs processes of an investor (or decision maker) are 
represented by a discounted Choquet expectation, under an axiomatic that avoids utilities on 
payoffs. Ambiguity is taken into account by the Core of the Choquet capacity. In order to take 
flexibilities (and options) into account, preferences must satisfy a weakened axiom of 
dynamic consistency (Karni and Schmeidler 1991, Nishimura and Osaki 2003) and of model 
consistency (Sarin and Wakker 1998) that rely future conditional valuations to the present 
criterion. 
 In section 3, we derive the joint capacity on the payoffs process in the case where uncertainty 
is described by a binomial tree. Then we investigate the limit behaviour of the joint capacity 
when the time intervals converge towards zero in order to obtain a “kind” of Brownian motion 
as the limit of the Choquet binomial random walk, in the following sections. We present some 
applications to real investments and portfolio choice in section 6. Section 7 relates our results 
to similar ones in the literature and concludes. 
 
2. Valuing uncertain cash payoffs processes 
 
In this part of the paper, we assume the DM oversees the future (i.e uncertain states at some 
future dates) as a finite set . A project, or a new investment, is formalised by its future cash 
flow, i.e. payoffs contingent on states   , say X() and the project is then represented by 
a measurable function X: (, 2)  R. 
 
2.1 The basic model 
 
The DM has preferences on a given project payoffs, hence she is able to compare measurable 
functions. Under our simplifying assumptions that  is a finite set, measurable functions are 
vectors in R. This set is endowed with a complete pre-order (of the DM’s preferences) and, 
under some axioms that’ll we present later on, this pre-order is represented by a real valued 
function V: R  R such that V(X) is the net present certainty equivalent of the uncertain 
payoffs X for the DM’s preferences (i.e. in this case the decision criterion). 
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Given that, in the uncertain future, the project may be influenced by information arrivals, it is 
defined as a strategy contingent on information sets.  
Information is formalised by a measurable function on a finite set I, Y: (, 2)  (I, 2I) so 
that, for any i  I, [Y = i] defines a sub-algebra of 2, ([Y = i]) = {A[Y = i] / A  2}. 
When information [Y = i] is obtained, the DM has preferences on uncertain cash payoffs that 
are measurable functions from (, ([Y = i])) into R that are, or may be, different from her ex-
ante preferences. These preferences are represented by a function V
[Y = i]
: R  R. 
Taking flexibilities into account amounts to integrate the value of the options to modify the 
project into its present value, in accordance with information arrivals of the type [Y = i], i  I. 
Indeed, when information [Y = i] obtains, the DM may modify her preferences over the 
project’s payoffs and hence its valuation. For instance, her aversion to uncertainty may be 
reduced, or increased depending on the type of information (“good” or “bad” news). Another 
example may be that, the DM learning she has more wealth available, her marginal utility on 
wealth may decrease with respect to what it was before information arrived
3
. 
 
In order to model future dates and uncertain states we can set:  = S  T, where S = {s1,…,sN} 
represents the set of uncertain states to whom the payoffs are contingent and T = {0,…,T}  is 
the set of dates at which the states may occur. A cash flow X:   R can be projected on both 
components and be considered whether as a random process or as a family of trajectories: 
X = (Xt)tT = (Xs)sS. 
 
A DM is usually aware of her preferences over payoffs contingent on uncertain states, i.e. 
measurable functions from S to R, i.e. vectors in R
S
 here. For instance, these preferences may 
satisfy Diecidue and Wakker (2002)
4
 axioms and be represented by a value function on the set 
of uncertain payoffs:  
Axiom1: Preferences define a complete pre-order on the set of measurable functions. 
Axiom 2: For any measurable function X, there exists a constant number (constant equivalent) 
for which the DM is indifferent to the function: X   E(X) (where   represents indifference). 
Axiom 3: Preferences allow no comonotonic Dutch Books. 
 
Let’s recall: 
                                                
3
 This is excluded by the usual setting of Expected Utility theory where the utility of wealth is defined ex-ante. 
Here it is excluded because the subjective capacity captures the whole behaviour towards uncertainty. 
4
 Or its extension in Kast and Lapied (2003) where uncertainty aversion is more detailed. 
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Definition 2.1.1: Two uncertain payoffs X and X’ are comonotonic if they satisfy: 
,’  , [X() – X(’)][X’() – X’(’)]  0. 
 
Definition 2.1.2: A comonotonic Dutch Book is a double sequence of comonotonic uncertain 
payoffs (Xj, X’j)jJ such that, for any j in J, Xj is weakly preferred to X’j but  
  , X j' ()
jJ
  X j ()
jJ
  and   , X j' ()
jJ
 > X j ()
jJ
 . 
 
Theorem 2.1.1 (Diecidue and Wakker, 2002): 
For a preference relation on R
S
 satisfying axioms 1 and 2, for all X in R
S
 there exists a 
constant equivalent E(X)  R such that the following three statements are equivalent: 
 
(i) E(.): R
S
  R  is strictly monotonic, additive on comonotonic vectors (but non 
necessarily additive on non comonotonic vectors). 
(ii) There exists a unique capacity such that E(X) is the integral of X with respect to 
this measure.   
(iii) E(.) is such that axiom 3 is satisfied. 
 
Otherwise stated:   a unique capacity on (S, 2S), Xt  E(Xt ) = Xtd
S
 . Notice that, in this 
representation theorem, the (subjective) capacity aggregates all of the DM’s behaviour: there 
is no need for a utility on payoffs, and the certainty equivalent is merely an expected 
(subjective) value. 
 
Similarly, a DM has preferences for present over future consumption (payoffs, here), i.e. 
preferences over payoffs contingent on dates. In this paper we assume that the DM’s 
preferences over certain future payoffs satisfy Koopman’s (1972) axioms and are represented 
by a linear form: 
Axiom1’: Preferences define a complete continuous pre-order on the set of measurable 
functions. 
Axiom 2’: Preferences are strictly monotonic. 
Axiom 3’: Preferences satisfy separability over dates. 
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Theorem 2.1.2 (Koopman 1972): 
For a preference relation on R
T
 satisfying axioms 1’ to 3’ for all X in R
T
 there exists a present 
equivalent D(X)  R such that: 
  a unique bounded additive measure on (T, 2T), Xs  D(Xs) = Xsd
T
 . 
As usual in the real options pricing literature, we shall define the decision maker’s criterion 
by the payoffs’ discounted expectation (here a Choquet expectation): 
X is preferred to X’ iff V (X) = DE(X) = [ Xtd ]
S
 d 
T
 [ Xt'd]
S
 d = DE(X ')
T
 . 
 
Notice however that this criterion is somewhat arbitrary as it introduces a hierarchy into the 
treatment of time and of uncertainty contingency. Another criterion would be ED(X) if the 
DM considered payoffs on a each trajectories and then integrated the discounted results. 
Because the Choquet expectation is not additive, it is not the case that ED(X) = DE(X) in 
general (for a general treatment of the double integral and a justification of one hierarchy over 
the other, see Kast and Lapied 2010). The hierarchy DE is the usual one and we choose it to 
keep our model close to the standard ones, this choice corresponds to a seventh axiom of the 
representation of preferences. 
 
Hierarchy axiom: Preferences of the DM over payoffs contingent on  = S  T, are 
represented by V = DE. The subjective product measure    on S  T captures the DM’s 
behaviour both on uncertainty and on time. 
 
Taking into account future information arrivals in the present valuation will require some 
consistency between the DM’s expected future behaviours and her present preferences, we 
shall express them by two more axioms. 
 
2.2 Consistency with information arrivals 
 
Dynamic consistency is supposed to answer the following question: Can we have X’ preferred 
to X ex-ante if, for any state of information i in I, V
[Y=i]
(X)  V[Y=i](X’)? 
The answer is yes, there are cases where we could. For instance, assume the set [Y=i] 
excludes the set on which X  < X’, so that on any set in ([Y=i]), X  X’. Then, if preferences 
are monotonic we could have a contradiction between unconditional and conditional 
 8
valuations
5
. However we need not have one because all the information values in I are 
possible ex-ante (and not only those in [Y=i]) and the decision maker may still take into 
account payoffs for which X  < X’ and then not prefer X to X’. But if, for all i’s, we had 
X  = X’ on [Y=i]
c
, then, indeed consistency with information arrivals would imply that:  
i  I, V[Y=i](X)  V[Y=i](X’)  V(X)  V(X’). 
 
This equivalence is the way Karni and Schmeidler (1991)
6
, for instance, expressed Dynamic 
Consistency (they did it in terms of preferences instead of their representation by a value 
function as we did, and they limited information to the case where it could take one value 
only).  
We’ll require a similar but weaker condition, as expressed for example by Nishimura and 
Osaki (2003), so that the axiom of Dynamic Consistency will be stated as: 
 X, X’, [i  I, V[Y=i](X)  V[Y=i](X’)]  V(X)  V(X’). 
 
Or, in terms of preferences: 
 
Dynamic consistency axiom: 
t = 1,…, T–1, X, X' such that: X(s) = X'(s),  = 0,…, t, s  S, 
  
[it  It,X f it
X '] X f

X '. 
In order to explicit the notations and to figure out the results, some requirements about the 
future DM’s behaviour are usually imposed, namely that the future preferences (after 
information is released) satisfy the same axioms as the present ones (Sarin and Wakker 1998).  
 
Model consistency axiom : Preferences conditional on information satisfy axioms 1, 2, 3 and 
1’, 2’, 3’, and the hierarchy axiom between time and uncertainty. 
 
We can now state the following condition expressing consistency between conditional and 
unconditional expectations. 
 
Proposition 2.2.1: Under the representation of preferences satisfying our nine axioms, for any 
X  RST,   {0,…, }, i  I, [Y=i]  F, t,   t  T, E (Xt ) = E [E[Y =i ](Xt )]. 
                                                
5
 For instance it would be the case if the decision maker’s preferences satisfied consequentialism. 
6
 But see also : Sarin and Wakker (1998), Machina (1998) and Ghirardato (2002). 
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Proof: Under the nine axioms, preferences are represented by value functions V = DE  and 
V
[Y=i]
 = D
[Y=i]
E
[Y=i]
 such that for any X  RST we can write: 
V (X) = DE(X) =  (t)E (Xt )
t=0
T
  and 
  {0,…,T},i  I,[Y = i] F ,V [Y =i ](X) =  [Y =i ](t)E[Y =i ](Xt )
t=0
T
  
with: t  {0,…, 1}, [Y =i ](t) = 0, [Y =i ]( ) =1,t  {,…,T}, (t) =  () [Y =i ](t). 
Let the certainty equivalent payoffs process be : EC(X) = ((X0),…, (XT)) and  
EC
[Y =i]
(X) = (X0,…,X 1,E
[Y =i]
(X ),…,E
[Y =i]
(XT )) , we have by definition:  
V(X) = V(EC(X)) and, i  I,V [Y =i ](X) =V [Y =i ](EC[Y =i ](X)) . 
Under the dynamic consistency axiom the last equality implies:  
i  I,V (X) =V (EC[Y =i ](X)). 
Thanks the definition of  [Y =i ] , this equality simplifies and yields7: 
  {0,…, }, i  I, [Y=i]  F, t,   t  T, E (Xt ) = E [E[Y =i ](Xt )]. QED 
 
Notice that this proposition says that dynamic consistency (together with all the other axioms) 
implies an implicit definition of conditional expectations (similar to its definition in the linear 
case): E (Xt ) = E [E
[Y =i]
(Xt )]. In the latter case, however, the definition implies that 
updating probabilities follows Bayes’ rule, whereas several updating rules are compatible 
with such an implicitly defined conditional Choquet expectation (Kast, Lapied and 
Toquebeuf, 2009).  
In this paper, we shall not rely on a particular updating rule, nor derive one, as if the decision 
maker had made up her mind, using for instance the Bayes’ rule, or the Dempster-Shafer’s 
one, or the Full Bayesian Updating rule, or any combination of these classical rules, or any 
more general one. As we shall see, our results do not rely on this choice. 
 
3. Dynamically Consistent Choquet Random Walk (DCCRW) 
 
                                                
7
 Notice that this relies on preferences on time contingent payoffs are represented by a linear form. If D were 
another Choquet expectation (as in Kast and Lapied 2009) with the discount factor a non-additve measure 
instead of an additive one as in here, the result wouldn’t hold. 
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Consider an investment with payoffs contingent on future states according to a binomial type 
tree (no probabilities for up and down movements are given). 
 
3.1 Binomial tree 
 
Time is defined by: t = 0, 1,…, T. 
Uncertainty is described by a binomial tree so that the uncertain states, s1, …, sn in S are 
trajectories, i.e. sequences of nodes in the tree: for i = 1,…, N, si = (s0,s1
i1,…,sT
iT )  with 
it = 1,…, t+1: 
 
     
         
 
       
       
          
   
 
         
    
         
 
 
A each t, the possible nodes are in St = {st
1,…,st
t+1}. The information process is such that the 
DM knows, at time t, the state that is realised at this date. The set of parts of St is At. 
The preferences of the DM over payoff processes such that: X = (X0,…, XT) are represented by 
a discounted (by a discount factor )  Choquet expectation with respect to a capacity  on 
(S, 2
S
), as in section 2, so that the certainty equivalent of the process is: 
DE(X) =  (t)E (Xt )
t= 0
T
 , 
s0
1
 
s1
1
 
 
s1
2
 
s2
1
 … 
s2
3
 … 
 
 
s2
2
 … 
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where: E (Xt ) = Xt (st )(st )
st St
 , with the usual notation for a Choquet integral for which, if, 
for instance, Xt(s1)   …   Xt(sN), (sn) = ({sn,…, sN}) – ({sn+1, …, sN}), with {sN+1} = , 
for notational convenience. 
 
In order to characterise a Choquet Random Walk, we impose that, for any node st at date t 
(0  t < T), if sut+1 and sdt+1 are the two possible successors of st at date t+1 (for, respectively, 
an “up” or a “down” movement in the binomial tree), the conditional capacity is a constant: 
(st+1u /st ) =  (st+1d /st ) = c , with 0 < c < 1. The common value c expresses the DM’s 
ambiguity about the likelihood of the states to come. 
The conditional capacities are normalized in the following way: 
( /st ) = 0,({st+1u ,st+1d }/st ) =1,B  At+1, (B /st ) = (B{st+1u ,st+1d }/st ). 
 
From proposition 2.2.1, dynamic consistency implies: 
  = 1,…,T–1,  t = ,…,T, [ Xt (st ) (st /s )]
stSt

s S
 (s ) = Xt (st )(st )
stSt
       (3.1) 
 
 
3.2 Characterization of the subjective capacity 
 
Now that a Choquet random walk is characterised, we show that preferences that satisfy the 
dynamic consistency axiom don’t leave much choice for the subjective capacity that 
represents them. 
 
Proposition 3.2.1: A Dynamically Consistent Choquet Random Walk satisfying relation (3.1) 
is completely defined by a unique capacity  satisfying: (st+1u /st ) =  (st+1d /st ) = c .  
 
Proof: In the proof, we can concentrate wlog on the characteristic functions X+n of the sets in 
A+n, because any random variable has a unique decomposition into a non-negative linear 
combination of the characteristic functions in a cone containing X+n and Choquet expectation 
is linear on this cone (Kast and Lapied, 1997). 
Three cases are to be considered. 
(i) If t = , relation (3.1) is trivially satisfied. 
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(iii) If t = +1, relation (3.1) becomes: 
 t = 1,…,T–1, [ Xt+1(st+1) (st+1 /st )]
st+1St+1

stSt
 (st ) = Xt+1(st+1)(st+1)
st+1St+1
      (3.2) 
For any t = 1,…,T–1, and any B  At+1, the conditional capacity (B/st) can only take three 
different values, because, if s
u
t+1 and s
d
t+1 are the two possible successors of st at date t+1, we 
have: 
(s
u
t+1  B and sdt+1  B)  (B/st) = 0. 
[(s
u
t+1  B and sdt+1  B) or (sut+1  B and sdt+1  B)]  (B/st) = c. 
(s
u
t+1  B and sdt+1  B)  (B/st) = 1. 
For Xt+1 = 1B, relation (3.2) can be written as: 
(B) = c({st : [st+1u  B][st+1d  B]}) + (1 c)({st : [st+1u  B][st+1d  B]})  (3.3) 
All the capacities at date t+1 are then uniquely determined by capacities at date t. Going 
backward until date 1 where (s11) =  (s12) = c , the set function  is completely defined and 
hence unique. 
It remains to prove that set function  is a capacity, i.e. is an increasing measure: 
B  D {st : [st+1u  B][st+1d  B]} {st : [st+1u  D][st+1d  D]} , 
then, from (3.3): B  D(B)   (D) . 
(ii) Finally, if t = +n, n > 1, relation (3.1) partially characterizes the conditional capacities 
(B/s), where B  A+n. We have, indeed 2+n+1 equations (the number of characteristic 
functions of the sets in A+n) for (+1)2+n+1 conditional capacities (one for each B in A+n and 
one for each node at date ). Then, these relations cannot constrain the capacity  defined by 
case (ii). QED 
 
Proposition 3.2.2: In a Dynamically Consistent Choquet Random Walk the capacity  is sub-
linear
8
 if and only if c  . Moreover it does not reduce to a probability if and only if c  . 
 
Proof: We only have to prove that: [ t = 1,…,T,  B  At, (B) + (BC)  1]  c  , 
because non-additivity results from the same reasoning. 
First, if the capacity is sub-linear, at date 1, for B = s1
1
 and B
C
 = s1
2
, (B) + (BC) = 2c  1, 
implies c  . 
The reciprocal obtains by induction and let’s assume that c   in the sequel: 
                                                
8
 A sublinear  (or convex) capacity characterises aversion to ambiguity (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993). 
 13
At the first stage, B  A1. B =  or B = S1, implies (B) + (BC) = 1, and B = s11 or B = s12 
yields: (B) + (BC) = 2c. The property is then established at date 1. 
Suppose that it is also true at date t and consider some B  At+1. From relation (3.3): 
(B) +  (BC ) = c ({st : [st+1u  B][st+1d  B]}) + (1 c) ({st : [st+1u  B][st+1d  B]}) 
 +c({st : [st+1u  BC ][st+1d  BC ]}) + (1 c)({st : [st+1u  BC ][st+1d  BC ]}). 
With the following notations: 
D = {st : [st+1
u  D][st+1d  D]}  and D = {st : [st+1u  D][st+1d  D]} , it follows that: 
(B) +  (BC ) = c[(B) +  (BC )]+ (1 c)[(B) +  (BC )]. 
We have: BC = BC  and BC = B
C
 therefore: 
(B) +  (BC ) = c[(B)  (B) + (BC )  (BC )]+  (B) + (BC ). 
With B  B(B)  (B)  0, and BC = BC  BC = BC (BC )  (BC )  0, and because 
c  , it follows that: 
(B) +  (BC )  1
2
[ (B) (B) +  (BC ) (BC )]+ (B) +  (BC ), or: 
(B) +  (BC )  1
2
[ (B) + (BC ) +  (B) + (BC )]. 
As D At+1 [D At D At ], by hypothesis: (B) +  (B
C
) 1, (B) +  (BC ) 1, and 
then:(B) +  (BC ) 1. QED 
 
3.3 Symmetric Random Walk 
 
We call Symmetric Random Walk a binomial process for which the “up” and the “down” 
movements correspond to the same magnitude. Without loss of generality, we take this 
increment to be the unity, and the departure point to be zero. In the probabilistic model, i.e. 
the case where c = , this process is a discrete time Brownian motion. 
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To compute the Choquet expectation of such a process we need to characterize the 
decumulative distribution function of capacity . 
 
Proposition 3.3.1: The decumulative function of capacity  is obtained by iteration from: 
 t = 2,…,T,  n = 1,…, t, (st1,…,stn ) = c (st11 ,…,st1n ) + (1 c)(st11 ,…,st1n1)     (3.4) 
and (s11) = c . 
The closed form of the decumulative function is: 
 t = 1,…, T,  n = 1,…, t – 1, (st1,…stn ) = ctn+1
j
t  n + j
 
 
 
 
 
	 (1 c) j
j=0
n1
  (3.5) 
 
Proof: We have: 
i =1,…,n 1,(st1,…,stn /st1i ) =1, (st1,…,stn /st1n ) = c,j = n +1,…,t, (st1,…,stn /st1i ) = 0  
If we apply relation (3.2) to X =1
st
1…stn
, it follows that: 
(st1,…,stn ) = c (st11 ,…,st1n ) + (1 c)(st11 ,…,st1n1)  (3.4) 
If we put the expression of the decumulative function given by relation (3.5) in the right hand 
side of relation (3.4), we have: 
c (st11 ,…,st1n ) + (1 c)(st11 ,…,st1n1)  
0 
1 
-1 
2 … 
0 … 
 
-2 … 
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 = c[c tn
j
t  n + j 1
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j
j=0
n1
 ]+ (1 c)[ctn+1 j
t  n + j
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j
j=0
n2
 ] 
 = ctn+1[
j
t  n + j 1
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j
j=0
n1
 + j
t  n + j
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j+1
j=0
n2
 ] 
 = ctn+1[1+
j
t  n + j 1
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j
j=1
n1
 + j 1
t  n + j 1
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c) j
j=1
n1
 ] 
 = ctn+1{1+ [
(t  n + j 1)!
j!(t  n 1)!
+
(t  n + j 1)!
( j 1)!(t  n)!
]
j=1
n1
 (1 c) j} 
 = ctn+1[
0
t  n
 
 
 
 
 
 (1 c)0 +
(t  n + j)!
j!(t  n)!j=1
n1
 (1 c) j ] 
 = ctn+1
j
t  n + j
 
 
 
 
 
 
j=0
n1
 (1 c) j  
= (st1,…,stn ) 
Therefore, relation (3.5) satisfies relation (3.4). QED 
 
Proposition 3.3.2: The Choquet Expectation of the payoffs at date t of a Symmetrical 
Choquet Random Walk is:  t = 0,…, T,  E(Xt) = t (2c – 1) (3.6). 
 
Proof: The payoffs of X at date t are: X(st
1) = t,X(st
2) = t  2,…,X(stt ) = t + 2,X(stt+1) = t . 
Then, their Choquet Expectation is: 
E(Xt ) = t[1(st1,…,stt )] (t  2)[(st1,…,stt ) (st1,…,stt1)] 
  +…+ (t  2)[(st1,st2) (st1)]+ t(st1) 
 = t + 2[ (st1,…,stt ) +  (st1,…,stt1) +…+  (st1)]. 
Relation (3.4) in proposition 3.3.1 implies: 
(st1,…,stt ) + (st1,…,stt1) +…+ (st1) = c[ (st11 ,…,st1t )  (st11 ,…,st1t1)] 
  + (st11 ,…,st1t1)  (st11 ,…,st1t2) +…+  (st11 ,st12 )  (st11 ) + (st11 )] 
  + (st11 ,…,st1t1) +…+  (st11 ) 
 = c + (st11 ,…,st1t1) +…+ (st11 ) . 
It follows that: 
E(Xt ) = t + 2[c + (st11 ,…,st1t1) +…+ (st11 )] 
 = t + 2[c + c +  (st21 ,…,st2t2) +…+  (st21 )] 
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 … 
 = t + 2[(t 1)c + (s11)] = t(2c 1). QED 
 
Remark 1: c <   E(Xt) < 0. This is consistent with the DM’s aversion to ambiguity that 
makes her give a negative value to a fair game. 
Remark 2: Other Symmetric Random Walks can be obtained from this one by a positive 
affine transformation. The Choquet integral is linear with respect to this transformation. 
For  t = 0,…, T, Yt = a Xt + b, a > 0, we have: E(Yt) = a t (2c – 1) + b. 
As a result we can address the cases where the mean is non zero and we can make volatility 
vary. 
 
4. Independence 
 
We want to consider two “independent random variables” XT and YT that represent the final 
payoffs of two Symmetric Choquet Random Walks. Obviously, “independent random 
variables” have to be defined in the context of non-additive measures. We do it in the 
following, using a slightly more general definition than the one usually adopted (e.g. 
Marinacci, 1997). In the sequel, we omit the time index, which is useless because we assumed 
dynamic consistency. 
The possible values of Y are: T, T – 2,…, – T + 2, – T. For a real interval [a, b], which doesn’t 
contain all these values but at least one of them, let D be the information of the decision 
maker: D = {s  S / Y(s)  [a, b]}. Similarly, let us define: B = {s  S / X(s)  [a, b]}. 
In this framework, relation (3.1) becomes: 
[
i=D,DC
 X(s) i (s)] (i)
sS
 = X(s) (s)
sS
   (4.1) 
As in section 3.1, the conditional capacities are normalised in the following way: 
 D  S, (/D) = 0, (S/D) = 1,  B  S, (B/D) = (BD/D). 
 
Whatever the updating rule used to define the conditional capacity, independence between 
two random variables expresses the idea that conditioning their joint distribution by any one 
of them yields the other’s marginal measure: 
 
Definition 4.1: The random variables X and Y are independent if and only if: 
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 D = {s  S / Y(s)  [a, b]}  S,  B = {s  S / X(s)  [a, b]}  S : (B/D) = (B). 
 
Notice that, most papers following Marinacci (1997) give a definition that is a particular case 
of this one: (BD) = (B) (D). Indeed, whatever the updating rule we have: 
 
Proposition 4.1: Under relation (4.1), if the random variables X and Y are independent: 
 D  S,  B  S, (BD) = (B).(D). 
 
Proof: 1B (s) (s)
sS
 = (B) =  (B /D) = (BD /D) = 1BD (s)D (s)
sS
 . 
On the one hand, we have: 
[ 1B (s)(s)].1D (s) (s)
sS

sS
 = (B) 1D (s) (s)
sS
 = (B). (D) , 
and on the other hand: 
[ 1B (s)(s)].1D (s) (s)
sS

sS
 = [ 1BD (s)D (s)].1D (s) (s)
sS

sS
  
= [ 1BD (s)D (s)
sS
 ].(D) = [ 1BD (s) i (s)] (i)
sS

i=D,DC
 , 
because: 
1BD (s)D
C
(s)
sS
 = (BD /DC ) =  ( /DC ) = 0. 
Relation (4.1), for  s  S, X(s) = 1BD(s), implies: 
[ 1BD (s) i (s)] (i)
sS

i=D,DC
 = 1BD (s) (s)
sS
 = (BD) , 
and then: (BD) = (B).(D). QED 
 
5. Convergence towards a Brownian motion 
 
We first characterise the variations of the decumulative function of the previous dynamically 
consistent Choquet random walk. 
 
Proposition 5.1:  t = 1,…, T,  n = 1,…, t +1, 
 tn   (st1,…stn )  (st1,…stn1) =
n 1
t
 
 
	 
 
 

 ctn+1(1 c)n1 (5.1)   where we set: (st0) = 0 . 
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Proof: Relation (5.1) is true for t = 1 and we suppose that it holds true for a given t (t  T). 
With relation (3.4), we have: 
 t+1n = c(st1,…stn ) + (1 c) (st1,…stn1)  c(st1,…stn1)  (1 c) (st1,…stn2)  
= c[(st1,…stn ) (st1,…stn1)]+ (1 c)[(st1,…stn1) (st1,…stn2)] 
= c tn + (1 c) tn1 
= c
n 1
t
 
 
 
 
 
 ctn+1(1 c)n1 + (1 c)
n  2
t
 
 
 
 
 
 ctn+2(1 c)n2  
=
n 1
t
 
 

 
 
	 
 +
n  2
t
 
 

 
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ctn+2(1 c)n1 
=
n 1
t +1
 
 
 
 
 
 ctn+2(1 c)n1 
Relation (5.1) is then satisfied for t + 1 and then for any t by induction.  QED. 
 
In order to interpret formula (5.1), recall that on a comonotonic cone, a capacity is represented 
by a particular probability distribution. Here it is a standard binomial distribution with 
parameters such that B(T, p) is in the core of capacity . Then, there’s an easy link with the 
multi-priors approach. 
For a convex capacity(c < ), the core is given by: 
Core = {μ, probability distribution / μ  }, and, over one period: 
[p = μ(st+1u /st )  (st+1u /st ) = c,1 p = μ(st+1d /st )   (st+1d /st ) = c] p [c,1 c]. 
For a Symmetric Random Walk: Eμ[Xt+1  Xt /st ] = 2p 1, so that the MaxMin criterion 
yields: ArgMin
μcore( )
Eμ (Xt+1  Xt /st ) = (c,1 c). This probability distribution, applied at each 
period, yields the binomial distribution corresponding to formula (5.1). 
 
Proposition 5.2: When the time interval converges toward 0, the Symmetric Random Walk 
defined by (5.1) converges towards a general Wiener process with mean m = 2c–1 and 
variance s
2
 = 4c(1–c). 
 
Proof: Recall that Xt is independent from Yt and the Yt’s are independent.  In the discrete time 
probabilistic model generated by (5.1), we have: Xt+1 = Xt + Yt, in which Yt takes the values: 1 
with probability c and –1 with probability 1–c.  
Then: E[Yt] = 2c–1 = m, Var[Yt] = 4c(1–c) = s
2
.  
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If we define a discrete time process Wt by: Wt = m h + s h
1/2
 Ut, where Ut takes values: 1 with 
probability  and –1 with probability , then E[Wt] = m h, Var[Wt] = s2 h.  
It is a standard result for Brownian motions that Wt converges toward a general Wiener 
process in continuous time: W(t) = m t + s B(t), where B(t) is the Brownian motion. QED 
 
Notice that if c < , then m < 0 and s2 < 1: both the mean and the variance are lower than in 
the probabilistic model. Indeed, ambiguity aversion yields lower weights on the ups and 
downs (c < ) for given values (+1, –1), hence the variance is lower. 
 
6. Applications 
 
We can find possible applications of this approach to any model with ambiguity, for example 
macroeconomics “uncertainty models” where central banks are not aware of the “true” 
economic model. Another famous application would be a generalisation of the portfolio 
optimal choice under risk (Merton 1969, 1971, 1973). Here, let us consider a generalisation of 
the so called real option theory, i.e. a basic problem of optimal investment (cf. Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994)). 
A firm can use a patent to invest and, after that, develop a production. The investment is 
irreversible and the corresponding cost is totally sunk. Therefore, we face an optimal stopping 
problem: The firm has to choose the optimal date to exert its option to invest (if it is worth it). 
In the basic model, the profit obtained when the patent is used follows a geometric Brownian 
motion (t)0tT (where T is the expiration date of the patent after which there is no profits) 
such that: 
 dt = μ t dt +  t dBt, (6.1) 
with 0  > 0, where Bt is the standard Brownian motion and μ and  are some real numbers, 
with  > 0 and μ < , where ,  > 0, is the firm discount rate. 
With the Choquet Random Walk, the profit is: 
 dt = μ t dt +  t dWt, (6.2) 
where Wt is given by Proposition 5.2: 
 dWt = m dt + s dBt, (6.3) 
with: m = 2 c – 1, and s
2
 = 4 c (1 – c), and then: 
 dt = (μ + m ) t dt + s  t dBt (6.4) 
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This relation is of the same type as (6.1), with μ’ = μ + m  and ’ = s  in place of μ and . 
We can see that 0 < c <  implies – 1 < m < 0 and 0 < s < 1, and then μ –  < μ’ < μ and 
0 < ’ < , a reduction of the instantaneous mean. But we also have the reduction of the 
volatility: an unexpected result! 
If we suppose that the horizon T is infinite, the value of the utilized patent V(t, t) does not 
depend on t directly and the model becomes stationary. The well known solution of the 
optimal stopping problem is then to invest at date t if and only if the value V(t) is larger than 
a reservation value V* such that: 
 V* =
 ' I
 '1
 (6.5) 
where I is the cost of the investment and the constant ’ is given by:9 
  '=
(μ' 1
2
 '2 ) + (μ' 1
2
 '2 )2 + 2 '2
 '2
 (6.6) 
The effect of the Choquet distortion on the standard solution is equivocal, because it reduces 
at the same time the instantaneous mean and the volatility. It follows that the comparison 
between ’ and  (with parameters μ and ) is a matter of empirical data. 
 
Consider now a stationary version of the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (Merton 
(1969, 1971, 1973). 
Let (kt)0tT, the capital of the investor, which has to be allocated between a riskless asset with 
rate of return r, r > 0, and a risky asset the price of whom follows a geometric Brownian 
motion: 
 dPt = μ Pt dt +  Pt dBt (6.7) 
with P0  > 0, where Bt is the standard Brownian motion and μ and  are some real numbers, 
with μ > 0 and  > 0. 
If (xt) is the part of the capital invested in the risky asset at date t, the program of the agent for 
a time horizon T is: 
 Max
(xt )0tT
Et[u(kT )], k0 > 0 (6.8) 
where u(.) is an increasing and concave utility function. 
In the iso-elastic case: 
                                                
9
 It is easy to check that μ < μ’ <  implies  >1 and then (6.5) is a solution of the problem. 
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u(k) =
k1
1
,  > 0,   1, 
the optimal solution is a constant: 
 x * (t,k) = x =
1

μ  r
 2
 
  
 
 	 
(6.9) 
With the Random Choquet Walk, this solution becomes: 
 x * (t,k) = x '=
1

μ'r
 '2
 
  
 
 	 
(6.10) 
with μ’ = μ + m  , ’ = s  , m = 2 c – 1, and s2 = 4 c (1 – c). 
If 0 < c < , we have μ –  < μ’ < μ and 0 < ’ < . It is easy to check that: 
 x'< x  μ  r

<  m
1 s2
=
1
1 2c
. 
The value of the market price of risk  relatively to the ambiguity parameter c, gives the 
hierarchy between investment in the risky asset under ambiguity and under risk. 
Similarly: 
 
x'
c
> 0  μ  r

<
1 2c + 2c2
1 2c
. 
The fact that investment in the risky asset is increasing with the reduction of ambiguity (when 
c increase towards , the ambiguity decreases) depends on the value of the market price of 
risk. 
 
In both applications, the effect of ambiguity is ambiguous! Our results differ from the ones 
obtained from applications of Epstein and Schneider (2003)’s recursive multi-priors model. 
As we shall see in the next section, results in both applications to real options (Nishimura and 
Osaki 2007) and to continuous time CAPM (Chen and Epstein 2002) are not modified 
because the effect of ambiguity is not straightforward. This is due to the deformations of both 
the mean and the variance in our model of Choquet expectations. 
 
7. Related literature and conclusions 
 
It may be useful to make more precise the link between Dynamically Consistent Choquet 
Random Walks and Recursive Multiple-priors in Epstein-Schneider (2003). In section 5, we 
have seen that, for a convex capacity, it was very simple to exhibit the possible conditional 
one-step-ahead priors, so that our model is recursive, indeed. But the Recursive Multiple-
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priors is based on a fundamental hypothesis: Rectangularity, and our model can be consistent 
with this approach only if this axiom is satisfied. We shall examine this point. 
Let us recall some notations briefly. 
The states space is , and the filtration is {Ft}0tT, (Ft is a finite partition). 
P is the set of priors, Pt() = {pt(): p  P} is the set of Bayesian updates, and 
Pt
+1
() = {pt+1(): p  P} is the set of conditional one-step-ahead measures. 
 
Definition 7.1: P is {Ft}-rectangular if for all t and , 
Pt () = { pt+1(')dm : pt+1(') Pt+1( ')',m  Pt+1()}, 
or Pt () = Pt+1dPt+1() . 
 
For a Dynamically Consistent Choquet Random Walk, the right hand side of the last equality 
is: 
Pt+1dPt
+1() = { p( /st )m(st )
stSt
 : p,m  core} = {p( /sti )m(sti ) : p,m  core}, 
for the state st
i
 such that  = {s0,…, sti,…, sT}. 
Under the assumption of independent random variables, wlog, we consider the state st
t+1
: 
Pt+1dPt
+1() = {pT tmt : p,m  [c,1 c]} = [cT ,(1 c)T ]. 
p  core implies from relation (5.1) in which t = T, and n = T + 1: p()  () = cT and 
p(c) = 1 – p()  ( c) = (1 – c)T. 
The left hand side in the definition of rectangularity is then: Pt () = [cT ,(1 c)T ], and this 
property is satisfied. As a consequence, all results obtained by the Multi-priors apply to the 
Choquet approach when the capacity is convex (c  ). However, the models differ and 
applications may not coincide. 
 
In order to emphasise the parallels and differences between the Dynamically Consistent 
Choquet Random Walk and the Recursive Multiple-priors, we can consider the continuous 
time model in Chen and Epstein (2002). 
In this last approach, we start from an “objective” distribution P, and a Brownian motion (Bt) 
with respect to P. The possible priors are the measures Q such that: 
dQ
dP
= zT
 , where zT
 is a P-martingale. 
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From the Girsanov theorem, it follows that a Brownian motion (Bt
) with respect to Q 
satisfies: dBt

= tdt + dBt , where (t) is a stochastic process adapted to the filtration 
generated by (Bt). In this equation, the variance is not affected, this differs from the 
Dynamically Consistent Choquet Random Walk where, indeed: dWt = m dt + s dBt. 
We can see how close our approach is to the ones obtained under Epstein and Schneider 
(2003) recursive multi-priors model, however there are some important differences in the 
results. For instance in our Choquet model, the continuous time Brownian motion is 
deformed, in contrast with what happens in Chen and Epstein (2002). 
The literature on Dynamic risk measures is very close to this method. Risk is measured, at 
time t, by the maximum of the expectations of minus the sum of discounted cash-flows, with 
respect to probabilities in a close and convex set, conditionally to the information at time t. 
This result is obtained under some properties: coherence, dynamically consistency and 
relevancy
10
. The crucial one, consistency, is equivalent to the rectangularity of Epstein and 
Schneider (2003), as noted by Riedel (2004)
11
. 
 
Dynamically consistent Choquet random walks are a generalization of the classical approach 
when some ambiguity of the decision maker about the payoff processes is taken into account. 
It has been seen that it is manageable and yields results that can extend the usual results in the 
real option literature. The effects of ambiguity is perceived both in the deformation of the 
mean and of the variance at the limit, when time intervals converge toward zero, in contrast 
with what happens in the probabilistic case. Because the random walk is defined step by step, 
the dynamic valuation is, indeed recursive. It is tempting, in the case when the capacity is 
convex, to refer to the literature on the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) multi-priors approach, 
following works and applications proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Epstein and 
Chen (2002) for example. Their results rely on the property they dubbed “rectangularity” that 
is satisfied by a DCCRW. However the ambiguity on the limiting variance that appears in the 
DCCRW is absent in the multi-Prior, so that DCCRW offer some other practical perspectives 
in applications. 
 
References: 
- Asano, T. (2005). “Irreversibilities and the optimal timing of environmental policy under 
Knightian uncertainty”. W.P., ISER. 
                                                
10
 See Riedel (2004), Theorem 1. 
11
 Note 2, p. 186. 
 24
- Chateauneuf, A., R. Kast, and A. Lapied. (1996). “Choquet pricing in financial markets with 
frictions”, Mathematical Finance, 6, 323-330. 
- Chen, Z., and L. Epstein. (2002). “Ambiguity, risk, and asset returns in continuous time”, 
Econometrica, 70, 1403-1443. 
- De Waegenaere, A., R. Kast, and A. Lapied. (2003). “Choquet pricing equilibrium”, 
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 32, 359-370. 
- Dieccidue, E., and P. Wakker. (2002). “Dutch Books: Avoiding strategic and dynamic 
complications and a comonotonic extension”, Mathematical Social Sciences 43, 135-149. 
- Dixit, R., and A. Pindyck. (1994).  Investments under uncertainty, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton NJ. 
- Epstein, L., and M. Schneider. (2003). “Recursive multiple-priors”, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 113, 1-31. 
- Duffie, D., and L. Epstein. (1992). “Asset pricing with stochastic differential utility”, Review 
of Financial Studies, 5, 411-436. 
- Ghirardato, P. (2002). “Revisiting Savage in a conditional world”, Economic Theory 20, 83-
92. 
- Gilboa, I., and D. Schmeidler. (1989). “Maxmin expected utility with non unique priors”, 
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141-153. 
- Gilboa, I., and D. Schmeidler. (1993). “Updating ambiguous beliefs”, Journal of 
Econonomic Theory, 59, 33-49. 
- Hammond, P. (1989). “Consistent plans, consequentialism, and expected utility”, 
Econometrica, 57, 1445-1449. 
- Jouini, E. and H. Kallal. (1995). “Martingales, arbitrage and equilibrium in securities 
markets with transaction costs”, Journal of Economic theory, 66, 178-197. 
- Karni, E., and D. Schmeidler. (1991). “Atemporal Dynamic Consistency and Expected 
Utility Theory”, Journal of Economic Theory, 54, 401-408. 
- Kast, R., and A. Lapied. (1997). “A decision theoretic approach to bid-ask spreads’, Finance, 18, 
115-137. 
- Kast, R., and A. Lapied. (2003). “Comonotonic bookmaking and attitudes to uncertainty”, 
Mathematical Social Sciences, 46, 1-7. 
- Kast, R., and A. Lapied (2010). “Valuing cash flows with non separable discount factors and 
non additive subjective measures: Conditional Choquet capacities on time and on 
uncertainty”, to be published in Theory and Decisions. 
 25
- Kast, R., A. Lapied, and P. Toquebeuf. (2009). “Updating Choquet integrals, 
consequentialism and dynamic consistency”, W.P., GREQAM. 
- Koopmans, T. (1972). “Representation of preference orderings over time”, in C. Mac Guire, 
and R. Radner (eds.), Decision and organization, North Holland, 79-100. 
- Machina, M. (1998). “Dynamic consistency and non expected utility models of choice under 
uncertainty”, Journal of Economic Literature, 22, 1622-1668. 
- Marinacci, M. (1997). “Limit laws for non additive probabilities and their frequentist 
interpretation”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84, 145-195. 
- Merton, R. (1969). “Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The continuous time 
case”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 51, 247-257. 
- Merton, R. (1971). “Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous time model”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 373-413. 
- Merton, R. (1973). “An intertemportal capital asset pricing model”, Econometrica, 41, 867-
887. 
- Miao, J., and N. Wang. (2007).”Risk, uncertainty, and option exercice”, W.P., Boston 
University and Columbia University. 
- Nishimura, K., and H. Ozaki. (2003). “A simple axiomatization of iterated Choquet 
objectives”, W. P. CIRJE, Tokyo University. 
- Nishimura, K., and H. Ozaki. (2007). “Irreversible investment and knightian uncertainty”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 668-694. 
- Riedel, F. (2004). “Dynamic coherent risk measures”, Stochastic Processes end their 
Applications, 112, 185-200. 
- Sarin, R., and P. Wakker. (1998). “Dynamic choice and Non Expected Utility”, Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 17, 87-119. 
- Schmeidler, D. (1989). “Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity”, 
Econometrica,  57, 571-587. 
- Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real options, The MIT Press, Cambridge Ma. 
- Trojanowska, M., and P. Kort. (2006). “The worst case for real options”, W.P., University of 
Antwerp. 
